

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NEA-11 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 CU-04 H-03 NSC-10

SS-20 DRC-01 /169 W

----- 037860

R 211802Z JAN 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9850

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 01055

SHAPE FOR INTAF: VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL: GENEVA FOR CSCE  
DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR: VERIFICATION AND STABILIZING MEASURES

REF: (A) U.S.NATO 241 AND 246, (B) U.S.NATO 243

BEGIN SUMMARY: PARTICIPATION IN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN  
NTM DATA REMAINS THE KEY MBFR VERIFICATION ISSUE FOR THE  
FRG. GERMANS OTHERWISE TEND TOWARD CONSERVATIVE APPROACH  
TO MBFR VERIFICATION, PLACING HIGHER VALUE ON AVOIDING  
INTERFERENCE WITH GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY OR CREATION OF  
SPECIAL ZONE THAN ON SEEKING FAR-REACHING VERIFICATION  
MEASURES. THIS MESSAGE ALSO DESCRIBES GERMAN VIEWS ON  
SOME ASPECTS OF SPC STABILIZING MEASURES TEXT. END  
SUMMARY

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1. NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM). FRG FONOFF OFFICIALS

REMAIN DIVIDED OVER THE EXTENT OF THE DESIRED MBFR VERIFICATION MEASURES, WITH HAUBER OF VERIFICATION DEPT ADVOCATING MORE AMBITIOUS MEASURES, AND RUTH AND GESCHER OF MBFR DEPT GENERALLY SUPPORTING U.S. POSITION OF PRIMARY RELIANCE ON NTM. DESPITE THIS LACK OF ACCORD, ALL COMPETENT GERMAN OFFICIALS STRONGLY EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF FRG/ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN THE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF INFORMATION DERIVED ESSENTIALLY FROM AMERICAN NTM. OUR SOURCES INDICATE, AS RANTZAU SAID IN JAN 14 SPC AND AS U.S. NATO COMMENTED REF A, THAT U.S. REACTION TO THIS ALLIED REQUEST WILL INFLUENCE SUBSTANTIALLY THE OVERALL GERMAN APPROACH TO VERIFICATION. HAUBER EXPRESSED RECOGNITION OF SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ATTENDING SENSITIVE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY AMERICAN NTM, BUT WONDERED WHETHER RESTRICTING THE NUMBER OF ALLIED OFFICIALS DEALING WITH NTM INFO MIGHT CIRCUMVENT U.S. PROBLEMS. HAUBER SAID THAT LONG-STANDING GERMAN REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN NTM SO FAR HAD MET "A WALL OF AMERICAN SILENCE"; HE INDICATED THAT FRG EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON MIGHT TAKE UP THIS ISSUE IN THE STATE DEPT.

2. LIAISON OFFICERS AND DURATION OF INSPECTORATES. BOTH RUTH AND GESCHER, AS WELL AS HAUBER, INSISTED ON HOST COUNTRIES' LIAISON OFFICERS ACCOMPANYING MBFR INSPECTORS (REF A - PARA 6) AND STRONGLY OPPOSED CONCEPT OF A "PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT" OF INSPECTORATES COVERING FRG TERRITORY (REF A - PARA 7). HAUBER SAID HE DOUBTED THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT MATERIAL VERIFICATION BEYOND NTM, BUT SAID MOSCOW WOULD IN ANY CASE BE LIKELY TO INSIST THAT HOST LIAISON OFFICERS ACCOMPANY ANY MBFR INSPECTORS. RUTH AND GESCHER NOTED THAT THE PREPONDERANCE OF SUCH INSPECTION, IN THE WEST, WOULD BE RELATED TO FRG TERRITORY. THEY ARGUED THAT BOTH THE EUROPEAN UNIFICATION PROCESS AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS EXCLUDED VERIFICATION MEASURES THAT WOULD INTERFERE WITH GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY OR COULD ENTAIL A SPECIAL ZONE. GESCHER OBSERVED THAT VERIFICATION ISSUES INVOLVE A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE AIMS OF OBTAINING INFORMATION ON SOVIET ADHERENCE TO THE AGREE-

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MENT AND AVOIDING INTERFERENCE WITH ONE'S OWN ACTIVITIES. ON BALANCE, SAID GESCHER, THE FRG PLACES A HIGHER VALUE ON AVOIDING SOVIET INTERFERENCE WITH GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY AND EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WOULD BE PREPARED TO LIVE WITH MORE MODEST VERIFICATION MEASURES.

3. SPECIFIC MEASURES. AS TO MEASURE A, HAUBER SAID

BONN PROBABLY COULD ACCEPT U.S. PREFERENCE FOR MOBILE TEAMS TO MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWAL AS THIS WOULD BE LIMITED IN DURATION. HAUBER SAID MEASURE B, INVOLVING USE OF MOBILE TEAMS TO MONITOR POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR BONN AS THIS MEASURE HAD NO TIME LIMIT; THIS COULD CREATE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS. HAUBER EXPECTED NO EARLY DECISION ON THIS ISSUE AND OPINED THAT THERE WAS NO URGENCY.

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9851

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

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4. COMMENT: GENERALLY CONSERVATIVE GERMAN APPROACH TO VERIFICATION SUGGESTS THAT FRG WOULD BE PREPARED TO RELY PRIMARILY ON AMERICAN NTM IF U.S. MEETS BASIC ALLIED REQUIREMENTS ON PARTICIPATION IN ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF NTM. END COMMENT.

5. STABILIZING MEASURES. AS TO LATEST REVISED SPC DRAFT TEXT (REF B), GESCHER SAID FRG WOULD NOT RPT NOT

INSIST ON FINAL BRACKETED SENTENCE OF PARA 3 ("IT IS  
RECOGNIZED THAT ADHERENCE TO THESE MEASURES...WOULD  
RESTRICT THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE..."). GESCHER  
ALSO SAID FRG COULD ACCEPT NOTIFICATION OF U.S./USSR  
MOVEMENTS "TO EACH OTHER" IN PARA 4, RATHER THAN "TO  
ALL OTHER PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT," AS DESIRED BY THE  
DUTCH. AS TO PARA 6, DEFENSE MINISTRY HAS INSISTED  
UPON GERMAN POSITION THAT SCHEDULE SEPARATELY LIST  
EACH ANTICIPATED ENTRY INTO THE AREA OF 5,000 OR MORE  
ACTIVE DUTY GROUND PERSONNEL WITHIN ANY 7-DAY  
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PERIOD. DEFMIN OFFICIALS ARGUE THAT LIMITING PRE-  
ANNOUNCEMENT REQUIREMENT TO ENTRY OF 5,000 PERSONNEL  
WITHIN 24-HOUR PERIOD WOULD RESULT IN SUBSTANTIAL  
SOVIET ABILITY TO MOVE FORCES INTO THE AREA WITHOUT  
PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT.  
HILLENBRAND

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY EXPENDITURES, MILITARY BUDGET, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MEETING DELEGATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, MILITARY PLANS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 21 JAN 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** BONN  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
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**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740128/aaaabanw.tel  
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**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** (A) U.S.NATO 241 AND 246, (B) U.S.NA, TO 243  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** garlanwa  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 20 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by worrelsw>; APPROVED <11 APR 2002 by garlanwa>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: VERIFICATION AND STABILIZING MEASURES  
**TAGS:** PARM, GE, NATO  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005